Most projection systems had the Tribe winning somewhere between 68 and 75 games in 2011.  I too thought that the Indians would win 70-75 games. Obviously the hot start is just that, only the beginning of a long season, but it’s hard not to get excited.  After all, isn’t that what April baseball is all about?  If their true talent level suggests that they’ll only win 72 games though, what are the chances that at some point during a 162-game season they’d have a stretch like this, winning 11 of 15?

In any given set of 15 games, they have a 2.28% chance of winning at least 11 games (1.72% of winning exactly 11).  They have a 148 sets of 15 games (games 1 to 15, 2 to 16…148 to 162), though the sets are interrelated.  If they had 148 distinct chances to win 11 of 15, they’d find a stretch like this about 96.7% of the time.  If we want to take the 15-game subset very literally, there are 11 (I’m rounding), giving them only a 22.4% of pulling off this feat.  We also know that a run like this would likely start with a win, as a 72-win team, they’d have about 60 chances to do this, increasing the chances to 75.0%.

So there’s a decent enough chance that during some half-month the Indians would play this well.  Doing it at the beginning of the season does two things though.  One, it allows the Indians to possibly run into another stretch like this at some point.  The odds that the Indians run into a streak like this remain the same (still 2.28%), but the number of opportunities to do so are only slightly fewer.  Two, even if the Indians play at their assumed talent level of 72 wins, they be viewed as a contender into the summer, and the Fans of the Feather will have something for which to root.

Let’s assume that beginning with the upcoming four-game series with Kansas City (for AL Central supremacy; who’d have thought that?)  the Indians play like a 72-win team.  Over their next 65 games we’d expect them to win approximately 29, making them 40-40 after 80 games.  As they approach the trade deadline, the people of Cleveland are not talking about who to trade away but what spare parts to acquire.

What if we adjust the Indians “talent-level” based on the hot start.  A team that wins 72 of 162 should win roughly 65 of 147.  If we make the Indians a 76-win team based on talent, they’d be 42-38 after 80 games, definitely in the mix.

This is all just math though.  While Michael Brantley and Asdrubal Cabrera have played over their heads so far, Carlos Santana and Shin-Soo Choo have done almost nothing and should come around.  Travis Hafner won’t hit .350 all year either, but the guy finally seems healthy, was the best hitter in the American League in 2005-2006, and has been semi-productive while hurt the last few seasons.  Sizemore homered and doubled in his first game in almost a year Sunday.  The starters have pitched well so far (enough to give home even when the BABIPs go up and LOB percentages come down) and the bullpen (especially the back end of Rafael Perez, Tony Sipp, and Chris Perez) has been terrific.

The Sons of the Cuyahoga have posted a +29 run differential so far, allowing the third-fewest runs and scoring the third-most runs in the American League.  No one was expected to run away with this division (90 wins seems unlikely for any of these teams).  Given that the White Sox and Tigers are off to mediocre starts and the major problems Minnesota is facing, the Erie Warriors and their fans might find themselves in a pennant race this summer earlier than they expected.

Season in and season out, Cain gives up a lesser percentage of home runs on fly balls than the average pitcher, both at home and away. Why? I can’t say with confidence, but Dave Pinto at Baseball Musings has come up with a theory that’s as good as any I’ve read: he surmised that Cain’s fastball is dropping less than the hitter expects, resulting in the ball being struck somewhere below the center of the ball, and either going straight into the air (as his 12.9% career infield fly ball percentage (IFFB%) might suggest) or at least somewhere inside the park*.

*Quick aside that I had not considered at any point until NOW: wouldn’t Oakland be ideal for him, given the enormous foul ground territory? *Checks*  In a small sample, granted, he’s pitched to a 1.16 ERA in 3 starts, his best ERA at any park where he’s had two or more starts. This could be coincidence, but I’m intrigued.

Do more infield pop ups matter more for pitchers in Oakland?  I too was intrigued, so I tried to look it up.  Not for Matt Cain.  But for every Oakland pitcher to pitch during the period for which we have the data.

Batted ball data has been recorded for nine seasons (2002-2010), creating a sample of 99 pitchers and 190 pitcher-seasons.  For all these pitchers, I created a database with about 40 columns, with everything from wins and losses to balls and strikes thrown to FIP and tERA.  That might seem like a lot of data, but after it’s parsed, there’s very little left.

Another item to note is that the batted balls are recorded only when they are hits or outs.  Many foul balls that are caught in Oakland go unnoticed in other ballparks and result in something else (or another foul ball).  There should be more fly balls recorded in Oakland because of these additional outs.

Of the 99 pitchers, only 38 of them threw at least 100 innings for the Athletics (I only looked at time with the Athletics for this study), allowing for roughly 50 innings in the Coliseum and 50 on the road.  If I further parse  the data, only 15 pitchers threw both 100 innings at home and on the road while with the A’s in the last nine seasons.

At first, I checked to see if there was any correlation between infield fly ball percentage (IFFB%) and ERA, RA, BABIP, FIP, xFIP, and ERA-FIP using the home and road stats.  More infield pop ups would lead to more outs thanks to the additional foul territory.

I used all three sets of pitchers (all 99, the 38, and the 15); if the theory has any weight, we would expect to see a negative correlation with the first three statistics (they go down as IFFB% goes up) for the home data, and there should be no correlation for the road data.   FIP and xFIP are theoretically supposed to normalize batted ball noise, and I’m really not sure what to expect from those, though I suppose there should be no difference.  If ERAs are lower though, then ERA-FIP should also be lower, and that would have a positive correlation.

Here are a few sets of results:

I could analyze them, but I realize I made a mistake.  IFFB% is the percentage of fly balls that are infield fly balls.  What I really needed was the percentage of batted balls that are infield fly balls.  To get that I multiplied IFFB% by the fly ball percentage (FB%), to get what I called TOTAL_IFFB%.  Here are those results:

I also did R-squared tests with the same data:

I would call it “mixed results,” and there aren’t any real patterns, at least not that I can see.  More importantly, this still isn’t what I really want.  What I want to know if having a higher TOTAL_IFFB% means something in the Coliseum.  For this I divided the pitchers into three groups: high TOTAL_IFFB% (above 6%), medium TOTAL_IFFB% (between 3 and 6%), and low TOTAL_IFFB% (below 3%).  For reference, Cain’s career TOTAL_IFFB% is 5.9%.  Here are some results:

As a control, here is the same test for the groups on the road (grouped again by Home TOTAL_IFFB%):

I included K/9, BB/9, and HR/9 for each group to determine if maybe one set of pitchers was simply inferior to the others.  All of these statistics are weighted by the innings pitched by each pitcher, so there’s a lot more Barry Zito in the >6% than Seth Etherton.  There are approximately as many innings in the 3-6% group as in the >6% and <3% groups combined.

Obviously there is less scoring in the Coliseum because it is harder to hit home runs, but we also see a decrease in walks (perhaps because pitchers are less worried about mistakes).

Quick aside and important point: holy crap does the Coliseum depress BABIP.  And it has to be the Coliseum, because the defenses, pitchers, and hitters should be relatively the same in both sets.  I checked and checked and checked this, and I’m pretty sure it’s right.  I’m not sure where I would have messed that up.  Plus everything else makes sense.

The pitchers combined to have a 4.03% TOTAL_IFFB% at home and a 3.95% TOTAL_IFFB% on the road.  The 0.08% difference is for roughly 20,100 batted balls at home and 19,500 batted balls on the road.  The tenth of a percentile difference, when applied to the 20,000 batted balls, is roughly 20.  2 per season.  Seems so wrong.  Then I found this:

One of the more interesting effects I found is that parks have a strong affect [sic] on the proportion of batted balls that are infield flies.

Team            FlysIF
Brewers         1.15
Mariners        1.12
Marlins         1.12
Reds            1.08
Devil Rays      1.07
---
Phillies        0.93
Royals          0.93
Indians         0.92
Diamondbacks    0.92
Giants          0.90

A player is 28 percent more likely to hit an infield fly in Milwaukee than he is in San Francisco. Why is that? My guess is that it has to do with foul territory. Since infield flies are only recorded when the ball is put into play, parks with a lot of foul territory are more likely to see foul pop-ups stay in and get caught, whereas ballparks with little foul territory will see a lot of pop-ups land in the stands and go unrecorded.

The problem with that theory is that while the parks at the bottom of the list do tend to be a little smaller in terms of foul territory, those at the top seem to be pretty average on the whole. Perhaps my data source is off, but there may be some other variable I’m not thinking of.

The A’s aren’t on either side of the list.  While a couple of years old, it hasn’t changed.  The park factor for infield flies in the Coliseum is close to neutral.  I have to agree with David’s last sentence: “Perhaps my data source is off, but there may be some other variable I’m not thinking of.”

There’s nothing there to suggest that getting more infield fly balls makes you a better pitcher in the Coliseum.  Matt Cain’s ability to limit home runs is what would continue to make him a very good pitcher in Oakland.  However, there’s so much bias in the manner that I carved up the data that I can’t be sure it’s correct.  Would love some reviewers to take a look…

Same for on-base percentage.  The percentage of plate appearances in which a player does not make an out.  Obviously valuable, since outs are the game’s most important limited resource.I’ve never liked slugging percentage.  Slugging percentage is the total number of bases a player hits for divided by the number of at-bats (average bases per at-bat).  Because the numerator is a binary choice (the event either happened or it didn’t) for the first two metrics, they can be expressed as percentages.  It’s tougher to do that with slugging percentage (despite its name), because the maximum would be 400% (a home run every at-bat) and the numerator can increase by 1, 2, 3, or 4, depending on the event.   And I think that’s why it bothers me.  It’d be like having a statistic for runs per game; that number really wouldn’t mean too much (obviously runs matter, but the rate statistic wouldn’t tell us anything).

The statistic “isolated slugging percentage” attempts to capture a player’s power only.  It’s measured by subtracting batting average from slugging percentage.  It’s valuable because, for example, there are many ways to have any given slugging percentage.  In 10 at-bats, you could hit 5 singles or you could hit a home run and a single for a 0.500 slugging percentage.  Same slugging percentage, different batting averages.  ISO shows that.  The units are still total bases per at-bat, which is an issue for me, and again, the  number itself doesn’t mean anything.  I’ve gone over and over this to make sure I define it correctly, so here I go: the numerator in ISO is the number of bases above one a batter achieves on each hit.  Singles and outs are 0, doubles 1, triples 2, and home runs 3.  Therefore, ISO groups singles and outs together, and I don’t like that.  Dividing by the number of at-bats gives the number of “extra bases” a batter achieves per at-bat.

Instead of just complaining about it though, I tried to develop something that would make more sense.  To do this I divided slugging percentage by batting average, making the units total bases per hit.  For one, this makes the total number of events in the numerator and denominator the same.  I’ve eliminated all at-bats that result in zero bases in my calculation.  Because of this, the scale is similar to total bases: the minimum is 1.000 and the maximum is 4.000.

Next, I wanted to test to see how well it described a player’s value on offense.  I plotted BA, OBP, SLG, ISO, and SLG/BA against wOBA (weighted on-base average), my favorite all-inclusive offensive statistic, for the 2010 season.  wOBA is a statistic based on linear weights designed to measure a player’s overall offensive contributions per plate appearance.  Using the observed run values of various offensive events from each player, (i.e. each single is worth 0.72 runs, each out is worth -0.28 runs), dividing by a player’s plate appearances, and scaling the result to the average on-base percentage results in wOBA.  Here is the plot for batting average (I’ve also marked Jose Bautista’s spot on all the charts, since he’s a major outlier – I thought this might help make the point…of course, as we’re about to see, I’m dumb):

Here is the same plot three more times, against slugging percentage, isolated slugging percentage, and my new total bases per hit statistic.

The closer all of those points are to the line, the more the statistic correlates with wOBA.  It’s easy to see from the plots that slugging percentage is the best, and isolated slugging percentage correlates fairly well.  Here are the actual measures:

Damning evidence.  For those without the statistics background, low numbers are bad.  My statistic sucks at actually telling us how good a player is offensively.  Important point here. I started writing this post in November.  I had what you see above figured out two hours into writing, and then I was stuck.  I couldn’t figure out how to make the statistic matter.  And then recently I had a revelation.  It matters because it makes sense.  It doesn’t have to tell us anything about a player’s overall offensive value.  The statistic itself tells us something, total bases per hit.  And from there I kept going with what you see below.  But first, I wanted to make sure I put this to bed.  I checked the stats for 2008 to 2010, just to make sure 2010 wasn’t a weird year.

And 2010 was generous to me.  My statistic is even more meaningless in 2008 and 2009.  But from here on out, it will be my preferred measure of the damage done by a hitter.  Until some smart commenter tells me why I’m wrong (which I assuredly am).

Now, instead of finding a better statistic about slugging that told me how good a hitter was, I found a better statistic about slugging.  But this did not stop my search for an easily-calculated statistic that more perfectly aligns with wOBA.  First attempt: slugging percentage, but with walks.  Basically, the denominator becomes plate appearances, and all walks and hit-by-pitches becomes singles.  It basically gives the batter credit for a base on walks.  Here’s the formula:

And the graph:

I’ll show the results in a minute, but I also wanted to test what would happen to my statistic* if I included walks.  Obviously, this gets away from the point of the measure (to better reflect slugging), but it’s possible that it could more accurately reflect a hitter’s value.

*I keep calling this “my statistic.”  Someone tell me if this has been done before.  I always feel like everything I create has been done before; if it made sense to me, it had to have made sense to someone years ago.  Thanks for the ego check, everyone.

Formula and graph:

Completely and utterly useless.  Summary:

BREAKING NEWS: Of these measures, slugging percentage and on-base percentage are most closely correlated with wOBA.  Every other measure is markedly worse.  My attempt to shake the baseball world = FAIL.

I don’t know enough about how much impact managers have and I don’t care enough about Gold Gloves to have too much of an opinion about those.  But here would be my official ballots for the other awards.  3 spots on the ballot for rookies, 5 for pitchers, 10 for the MVP award.  Without further ado:

American League Rookie of the Year

1.  Austin Jackson

2.  Brian Matusz

3.  Danny Valencia

This crop of rookies isn’t great, but these guys had good seasons.  The argument for Jackson centers around his 675 plate appearances and .293 batting average (helped by a .396 BABIP).  Playing a good centerfield for an entire season puts him over Matusz for me, who went 10-12 with a 4.30 ERA in the very difficult AL East.  He made 32 starts, pitched 175 innings, and is already Baltimore’s best starting pitcher.  Valencia hit .311 at third base for the Twins and solidified a position that was killing them in the first half of the season.  Valencia played just 85 games, which just isn’t enough playing time for me; it’s also my argument against Neftali Feliz, who might have been the best (and be the most talented) of all these guys, but who pitched just 69 innings to get his 40 saves.  Whoever wins will be fine with me.

National League Rookie of the Year

1.  Jason Heyward

2.  Buster Posey

3.  Jamie Garcia

Unlike the American League, the National League had a host of good rookies.  In addition to the three above, Mike Stanton, Stephen Strasburg, Starlin Castro, Ike Davis, Alcides Escobar, Gaby Sanchez, Jhoulys Chacin, and Mike Leake all had promising starts to their careers.  Jaime Garcia pitched 163 innings with a 2.70 ERA and still should finish a distant third.  I’m not going to complain about either of the first two guys winning.  Posey played the more difficult position and was the heart of his team’s offense.  Heyward was slightly better, much younger (doing what he did at age 20 is very rare), and played the entire season.  I know that Posey missing the first two months wasn’t his fault, but Heyward played, and played well, and thus gets the edge.

American League Cy Young

1.  Felix Hernandez

2.  Francisco Liriano

3.  Cliff Lee

4.  CC Sabathia

5.  Justin Verlander

Apologies to David Price, Jered Weaver, and Jon Lester.  Hernandez wins because he finished in the top three in the American League in the following categories:  ERA, hits per 9 innings, WHIP, strikeouts, complete games, innings pitched, FIP, xFIP, and WAR.  Yeah, that’ll do.  He finished 13-12, which will be tough for some voters to choose over the 21-7 Sabathia, but he’s the only answer.

National League Cy Young

1.  Roy Halladay

2.  Adam Wainwright

3.  Josh Johnson

4.  Tim Lincecum

5.  Ubaldo Jiminez

Hernandez’s season was good; Halladay’s was better.  A 2.44 ERA in 250 innings, he struck out 219 hitters and walked only 30.  He threw 9 complete games and 4 shutouts in 33 starts.  He finished second in the NL in WHIP (1.04), third in ERA, and first in xFIP.  All of the guys on this list were really good this season, but Halladay was the best.  219 K to 30 BB in 250 innings?  Legit.

American League Most Valuable Player

1.  Josh Hamilton

2.  Evan Longoria

3.  Miguel Cabrera

4.  Jose Bautista

5.  Adrian Beltre

6.  Robinson Cano

7.  Felix Hernandez

8.  Joe Mauer

9.  Cliff Lee

10.  Shin-Soo Choo

Despite missing the final month of the season, Hamilton was clearly the best player in the American League this season.  Playing 133 games is the only reason that this award wouldn’t be Hamilton’s, and no one else makes a really strong case.  Hamilton can play defense (both left and center), run a little, and can flat-out mash.

National League Most Valuable Player

1.  Joey Votto

2.  Albert Pujols

3.  Ryan Zimmerman

4.  Carlos Gonzalez

5.  Troy Tulowitzki

6.  Roy Halladay

7.  Matt Holliday

8.  Adam Wainwright

9.  Adrian Gonzalez

10.  Aubrey Huff

Votto and Pujols had basically the same season.  Look at the top two rows of this table.  I’m going with Votto because Cincinnati was better.  I’m generally not a big fan of “guy on better team should win MVP,” but these two guys are so close that it’s the only tiebreaker left.  Also, I think it’s fair to note that this was the second worst season of Prince Albert’s career, and I’m putting him second on my fake MVP ballot.

• Roster construction: how many different ways to get to the goal? (H/T to Loyal Reader Mac, whose silly banter has provided the idea for many of these posts)
• AL and NL Award Ballots (MVP, Cy Young, and Rookie of the Year): I will publish these before the awards are announced (I have my lists, but I want to offer some analysis with them as well, so be patient).
• I’ll be going back through the first 70 posts and checking all of my predictions.  All of them: the good (David Wright and Ubaldo Jimenez), the bad (Scott Baker is a sleeper Cy Young candidate), and the ugly (HEY SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS).

Thanks again to everyone for reading and helping to make this “realer.”

Want several things known before the WS begins: 1. Think it’s better to sit Vlad, start Murphy and have Vlad PH for pitchers in NL games? about 7 hours ago via web

2a. I’m a Cliff Lee fan-boy…but aren’t the Giants the right kind of team to get him? Right-handed, not too patient? Stay with me… about 7 hours ago via web

2b. I know the SF hitters suck, but to hit Cliff Lee, wouldn’t you want RH hitters who attack so they aren’t always behind 0-1, 0-2, 1-2? about 7 hours ago via web

2c. People are writing about this series like Games 1/5 are in Texas’s pocket. Lincecum (and the SF bullpen) is too good to assume that. about 7 hours ago via web

2d. Lee is really, really good, but I just want to allow for the possibility that he might give up runs to a Major League Baseball team. about 7 hours ago via web

3a. Rangers are favorites (and should be), maybe 55-45. Won’t be shocked with any outcome (save a sweep either way). Should be close/fun. about 7 hours ago via web

3b. That said, odds of Tex or SF in 5, 6, 7 are fairly close, so I’ll just pick one. SF in 6. MVP: Matt Cain. LVP: Everyone not watching. about 7 hours ago via web

To be fair, I wasn’t expecting this:

Also being fair, I’m really smart.  But here’s what I was thinking:

1. Vladimir Guerrero is bad in right field.  That’s why he doesn’t play there during the season, and that’s why this is even an issue.  In San Francisco in Games 1 and 2, the Rangers will be facing Tim Lincecum and Matt Cain, both right-handed.  Guerrero hit 0.287/0.328/0.482 against right-handed pitching this season.  He hit 22 home runs in 442 at-bats.  David Murphy, who can actually run around in the outfield, hit 0.298/0.368/0.479 against right-handed pitching this season, with 11 home runs in 305 at-bats.  Is that worth playing someone as bad as Vlad in right field?  Guerrero would make for a big-time pinch hitter in the late innings also, giving Ron Washington a better option than Jorge Cantu or Jeff Franceour.  I understand that all of these guys are right-handed and Murphy is a lefty, which adds to bench flexibility; I just think it’s more important to have the best players playing most of the game.  Also Guerrero is better against right-handed pitching than Murphy is against left-handed pitching, if that makes sense regarding roster flexibility.

2.  I get the Cliff Lee obsession.  I’m one of its founders, leaders, rallying members, etc.  The guy is awesome.  But it’s not automatic.  It’s not “give him the ball and let’s get C.J. Wilson a 1-0 lead.”  It’s not “we only have to win 2 of 5 because Cliff has 2.”  Lee beats people by being in the zone and getting ahead in the count.  Then he can throw whatever he wants (wherever he wants, the reason he’s really good); therefore, not letting him get ahead would be a good thing, and the Giants are not the planet’s most patient baseball team:

Also, I thought being right-handed heavy would help, but oops.  Lee was absolutely brutal on right-handed hitters in 2010, even more so than lefties (RHB: 0.227/0.243/0.348 / LHB: 0.281/0.294/0.411).  In conclusion, who cares if the numbers don’t back up the logic?  Tonight, the hypothesis equaled the results and I’m genius, so stick it.  Or I’m really lucky…you can pick.

3. Baseball is a funny game.  Those who read this blog know that we need a lot of data to really understand what’s happening.  Any 7-game sample of data has a lot of randomness.  Why should the World Series be any different?  For example, I still think the Yankees are better than the Rangers and the Phillies are better than the Giants.  But that’s not what the playoffs discover; they find out which team is better in these seven games.  If the Pirates played the Yankees in a best-of-seven series 1,000 times, the Pirates might still win 30 percent of the time.  Putting two teams that are more evenly matched only makes that percentage closer.  I don’t think I would ever say that an underdog in the playoffs has less than a 40 percent chance of winning their series.

When sabermatricians talk about luck, it’s not always about the breaks of the game; it can also be about random variation within a player’s own talents, and collectively, a team’s talents.  Texas was “unlucky” tonight to have Bad Cliff Lee; doesn’t mean Lee is a bad pitcher.  80% of the time he probably throws a gem, but that’s not the Cliff Lee Texas had tonight.  So whatever…”Giants in 6, Matt Cain” is as good a choice as “Rangers in 7, Nelson Cruz” and 100 other combinations.  That’s why they play the games, and that’s why this is so fun.

4:56 PM PST:  I’ll say this for San Francisco fans: there is no worse feeling than losing a Game 5 at home with your ace on the mound.  It seems like there are three chances to close this out, but if the Phillies win, they go back home only needing two wins with Oswalt and Hamels pitching.  It no longer seems so daunting.  I’m writing this as a someone who had this happen to him three years ago.  The Indians never had a lead in Game 5, and Josh Beckett beat CC Sabathia for the second time in the series.  The Indians never led again in the series (down 10-1 after 3 in Game 6 and Jake Westbrook gave up a run in each of the first three innings in Game 7) and the 2007 ALCS reached the level of the 1995 World Series in the Hennessey household.

4:59 PM:  Big Time Timmy Jim starts off with Victorino with four fastballs and gets a weak pop-up to first.  The fastballs are a good sign; he got the Braves out in the Division Series by throwing a bunch of crap and watching them swing.  The Phillies won’t help him out that much, and I think not adjusting his game plan hurt him a little in Game 1 of the NLCS.

5:01 PM:  All fastballs to Polanco as well, who hits a fliner to Torres in center.  I like that Bochy has gone back to Torres for Game 5.  If he’s your guy, you have to run him out there unless he’s actually hurt.  If he just sucks lately, well, there is a reason he’s played more than Roward this year.

5:03 PM:  First changeup to Utley gets a weak groundball to second.  12 pitches, 11 fastballs, 3 outs: excellent start for Lincecum.

5:06 PM:  Watching Halladay’s first three pitches to Torres, seems like the strike zone is shifting with the count.  Both 2-0 pitches to the leadoff hitters looked a little low, but were given to the pitcher; both also happened after the second pitch looked like a strike.

5:07 PM:  Torres walks and that’s a nice bonus for the Giants.  Not too many gifts from Halladay usually.

5:08 PM:  Torres goes on a 1-0 pitch and Sanchez lines the ball back up the middle; 1st and 3rd, no one out.  This should be multiple runs, I don’t care who is pitching.  No matter what Manuel and Bochy say, playing for one run (for the game) in the top of the first inning is stupid.

5:11 PM:  Huff lines one to first and that’s just bad luck.  Nice play by Howard diving to his right.

5:12 PM:  That’s about as strange of a 4-3 fielder’s choice as I’ve ever seen.  Posey hits a dribbler to Utley who was going to try to tag Sanchez and still get Posey at first; instead, the ball bounces off Utley’s glove and he has to just flip it (non-chalantly I might add) to second (Sanchez stopped running to avoid being tagged).  Another good break for the Giants, and it’s 1-0.  Game over for Bochy, he can stop managing now.

5:13 PM:  Halladay strikes out Burrell and escapes.  Unfortunately, Bochy decided he only needed one run to win and called off the dogs.

5:16 PM:  After an inning of fastballs, first pitch curve to Ryan Howard.  Scouting report on Howard: loves fastballs and the Meatball Marinara footlong, hates offspeed pitches and anything you put vegetables on.  And strikeout.  Scene.

5:21 PM:  Hey, the outside corner does exist!  Lincecum gets a Werth looking on a pitch that couldn’t have been more perfect; not sure what Werth would have done with that besides hit a dribbler to second.

5:23 PM:  And Lincecum is perfect through two on just 26 pitches (16 strikes).  If he keeps it up, he could probably trade in Big Time Timmy Jim for the Freaky Franchise.

5:27 PM:  Halladay just got away with one against Cody Ross on a 1-2 pitch; it was the same location of the pitches that Ross has been terrorizing.    Doesn’t matter, he gets Ross swinging on the next pitch.  PS Also doesn’t matter: it’s still Cody-tober…am I right?

5:31 PM:  After an extensive discussion about Pablo Sandoval’s conditioning, he grounds out to shortstop.  That’s one of those situations where I wish they’d show Buck and McCarver in the booth so that Buck could put his hands in the air like, “I don’t know what he’s saying either!”

5:35 PM:  Halladay is through two, but after 43 pitches.  All three Giants in the second had good at-bats against him, and Sandoval and Uribe hit the ball pretty hard.  Something to keep an eye as we get into the middle of the game.

5:37 PM:  Raul Ibanez hits a bleeder into right-center as he almost falls over swinging, and the Phillies have a little something going with the bottom of the order.  After Ben Francisco’s Game 4 performance, I’ll be surprised to see The Franchise get too many more at-bats in this series (also, after that hit, Lincecum is back to Big Time Timmy Jim).

5:39 PM:  A slider gets away from Lincecum and hits Ruiz on the arm; with Halladay coming up, a bunt is the easy call.

5:40 PM:  Well, that was weird.  Halladay bunts the ball onto the plate, Posey grabs it in foul territory and fires to third, Sandoval misses the base trying to get back to it (he was playing in for the bunt), and Halladay never moved because he thought it was foul so Sandoval had plenty of time to throw Halladay out at first.  Uh, I guess the Phillies got what they wanted, but Ibanez was almost out at third (on a bunt that was foul) and Halladay could have been on first if he had run as soon as he bunted the ball.  Either way, score it: Sacrifice Bunt 2-5-3.

5:41 PM:  Back to the top of the order, Victorino.  He hits a two-hopper to Huff on a fairly easy hop and it bounces off the heel of Huff’s glove and into shallow centerfield.  Both runs score and Victorino ends up at second.  Unfortunately, Bochy has to wake up to try to help his team score more runs.

5:44 PM:  Polanco singles to left and Victorino scores.  What a mess of an inning for the Giants.  Still only one out.

5:49 PM:  After a long at-bat, Utley singles up the middle and Polanco, running on the pitch, moves to third.  “And at some point, Ryan Howard is going to have to chip-in with an RBI,” says Joe Buck.  Yeah, he’s hitting 0.357 in the series.  His bad.

5:52 PM:  Howard strikes out on a 1-2 changeup, but Utley steals second.  2nd and 3rd, 2 outs.

5:53 PM:  Just thinking out loud: this would be an excellent time for Werth to make himself a lot of money.

5:53 PM:  Werth is already to going to make a lot of money this winter; adding “clutch” to the packet that Scott Boras will be sending everyone will help.

5:54 PM:  A harmless fly to left and the inning is over.  All of a sudden, Halladay has a two-run lead; guy just knows how to win games.  Lincecum with 27 pitches in that inning after just 26 in the first two combined.

6:02 PM:  An infield single by Torres in the bottom of the third, but otherwise a quick inning.  Only 12 pitches for Halladay, now at 55 for the game.

6:09 PM:  A Rollins strikeout, Ibanez line out to third (shattered bat), and Ruiz ground to short make up the top of the fourth.  14 pitches.  The bat that shattered ending up sticking straight out of the ground…seems very safe.

6:13 PM:  Posey leads off the bottom of the fourth with a groundout to Rollins.  Halladay looking more like Halladay for the last four hitters; he’s retired seven in a row.

6:13 PM:  JINX! Burrell smokes an inside fastball into the left field corner and hustles into second.  Watching Pat Burrell run hurts.  And look who’s coming to bat…

6:13 PM:  I realized what I just wrote is insanity…every Cody Ross at-bat is an event now and expectations are out of control.

6:15 PM:  I’m the greatest!  Ross doubles down the right field line and it’s a one-run game.

6:17 PM:  Sandoval flies out to Werth, who throws a BB to third to nail Ross trying to advance.  Because apparently there were things Cody Ross could do with from third with two outs that he couldn’t do from second.  Also now apparent: Cody Ross is fallible.  We’re through four, 3-2 Phillies.  Halladay 66 pitches (45 strikes), Lincecum 71 pitches (47 strikes).

6:23 PM:  1-2-3 for Lincecum (with a little help from Uribe) in the fifth as he sets aside Halladay, Victorino, and Polanco on nine pitches.

6:28 PM:  With two outs in the fifth, Ryan Howard has a ball hit off the heel of his glove and the ball rolls toward Utley, but Torres reaches first.  Let’s see if the Giants can make the Phillies pay.  My guess: no.

6:30 PM:  Well, Sanchez did his part.  A single to left off the end of the bat on a tough off-speed pitch puts runners at first and third for Aubrey Huff.  The rain is visible on the television now; I was never sure who this bothered more.  Hitters have to see the ball and grip the bat.  Pitchers have to grip the ball and go through their motion.  I side with advantage: pitchers.

6:33 PM:  Huff hits a ball 25 feet and Ruiz makes a nice play to throw him out at first.  Definitely a missed opportunity there.

6:40 PM:  Lincecum retires the heart of the Phillie order.  89 pitches.

6:41 PM:  6 innings, 3 hits, 3 runs, 6 strikeouts, no walks.  Lincecum has pitched really well except that he gave up all three hits in the third inning (and let’s not forget Sandoval missing third and Huff’s error).

6:44 PM:  Buster Posey leads off the bottom the sixth against Halladay.  Apparently, Buster Posey reminds some people of Derek Jeter; I had no idea he hated A-Rod also.

6:46 PM:  He draws a walk laying off two knee-high pitches.  Might seem stupid to say, but he’s really good.  Just things like only swinging at strikes make him a really good player.  UPDATE: Maybe he should have struck out. He’s still good.

6:50 PM:  After Burrell popped out to shortstop, Cody Ruth (Babe Ross?  Nope, got it: George Herman Ross.)  strikes out.

6:53 PM:  Sandoval rips a ball through the hole on the right side of the infield and Posey stops at second.

6:56 PM:  Situation: 1st and 2nd, two out, down one, bottom 6th.  Mike Fontenot has stepped on-deck to hit for Buster Posey.  My question is: is it worth walking Uribe to get Lincecum out of the game?  Probably not, because Uribe will get himself out a lot.  Also because Lincecum probably only has one more inning.  And because the Giants bullpen is good.  But if not for all of those reasons, I’d think twice about it.

6:57 PM:  Uribe gets himself out swinging at ball four, and Halladay is through 6 innings.  108 pitches, 6 hits, 2 walks, 2 runs, 5 strikeouts.  One more inning?  I say yes.

7:02 PM:  After a Jimmy Rollins single, Lincecum gets Ibanez on a change up check swinging.  He had no idea what the last two pitches were.

7:04 PM:  Rollins steals second.  He hasn’t been very good since the last two seasons, particularly considering the peak of his powers during his 2007 MVP season, but he always seems to help out somehow.  Maybe I just really like that Dick’s commercial that he’s in.

7:06 PM:  Rollins steals third.  He’s (now) the greatest.  The two stolen bases added almost half a run to the expected run total this inning for the Phillies.  I know runs don’t count until they score (and that math is hard), but that matters.

7:07 PM: Ruiz walks, and Buck and McCarver speculate that Bochy might go to Javier Lopez.  Don’t do it, Boch.

7:09 PM:  And sometimes it’s better to be lucky than good.  Pinch-hitter Ross Gload smokes a ball into Aubrey Huff’s glove, and he steps on first to double-up Ruiz.  Lincecum: 7 innings, 4 hits, 1 walk, 3 runs (2 earned…debatable), 7 strikeouts, 104 pitches.

7:11 PM:  I would like a hat with the entire city of San Francisco on it also.

7:16 PM: Contreras is in for Philadelphia, and thinking back on it, Halladay did look kind of gassed.  It’s seemingly just so easy for him to throw 125 pitches.  Now Fontenot pinch hits, and he whiffs on four pitches.

7:19 PM:  Torres dribbles one up the middle, and the Giants have something going with the heart of the order coming up.  But Freddy Sanchez has to hit first.  Those are the rules.

7:21 PM:  Sanchez lines out to third, and that’s it for Jose Contreras.  J.C. Romero coming in.

7:21 PM:  I still think the Taco Bell commercial with Girardi and Rivera is funny.  Finish your chalupa, son.

7:25 PM:  Huff gets jammed, hit a dying quail toward second, and Utley could not have caught the ball with any less of his glove.  It stayed in though and it’s 3-2 as we go to the 8th.

7:29 PM:  Romo in for the Giants, and he gets Victorino to bounce to first.  His beard looks like the fake ones people have been wearing in honor of Brian Wilson’s.  Either way, they are both gross.

7:35 PM:  Romo walks Polanco, prompting Bochy to bring in Lopez to face Utley and Howard.  Giants can’t afford to give up any more runs given how difficult it is for them to score.

7:38 PM:  Lopez strikes out Utley looking; Utley now 0 for 9 against Lopez in their careers.

7:40 PM:  And Howard hits a lazy flyball right at Burrell.  Posey-Burrell-Ross coming up for the Giants.

7:48 PM:  Madson in for the Phillies and strikes out Posey and Burrell, both swinging.

7:48 PM:  Glad we’re done with those two because G. H. Ross is up!

7:51 PM:  Madson strikes out the side, getting out two of the greatest ten hitters in Giants history.  The list in a very particular order: Jeff Kent, Buster Posey, Willie McCovey, J.T. Snow, Ryan Garko, Mel Ott, Barry Bonds, Cody Ross, Willie Mays, and Duane Kuiper.

7:53 PM:  Jayson Werth homers down the right field line off Ramon Ramirez.  The vibe I’ve gotten from his pending free agency is that the Phillies are just going to let him go because of Dominic Brown; I’m not sure if that’s true, but it’s my perception, and it seems crazy to me.  4-2 Phillies.

8:00 PM:  A Rollins flyout, an Ibanez single, and a Ruiz flyout occur.  The last five minutes have bored me.

8:01 PM:  Luckily Charlie Manuel saves me; he puts in The Franchise to pinch hit.  A dribbler on a half-swing to third and Sandoval makes an errant throw to first.  First and second with 2 out and Bochy is bringing in Affeldt to face Victorino.

8:05 PM:  Victorino strikes out, leading to my favorite ten minutes in sports: Brad Lidge Time.  I think Uribe should go up to bat wearing an Albert Pujols mask.  If he taped “Pujols” over “Uribe” on the back of his jersey and just showed it to Lidge, would that be enough?  I say yes.

8:07 PM:  That home run always makes me forget Brad Lidge is a really good pitcher who gave up one really long home run at a bad time.

8:08 PM:  Just looked it up: that ball Pujols hit off Lidge is currently orbiting Saturn.

8:09 PM:  Paraphrasing but “the best thing that happened last inning was Werth’s home run” and “the Giants can’t tie the game without someone getting on base.”  Two pieces of analysis from Mitch Williams in ten seconds.  Changed my life.  I wish there were more ways to use math to analyze baseball.

8:10 PM:  Two guys coming up who will try to tie the game with one swing.  Oh wait, they need a guy on base first.  My fault.

8:10 PM:  I promise, Juan Uribe will not get cheated when he takes his hacks.

8:11 PM:  Sandoval pops out to right leading off the 9th and Uribe follows by grounding out to shortstop.

8:13 PM:  Ishikawa strikes out in the pitcher’s slot and that looked easy for Lidge.  Back to Philadelphia for Game 6 on Saturday night.  All of a sudden, it feels like the Phillies…well, let’s let them play more games first.  Momentum, thy name is Roy Oswalt.

The rate at which pitchers throw strikes aligns perfectly with the average run expectancy in each count. However, batters’ swing rates are not likewise dictated by run expectancy. Instead, batters like to swing more the deeper they get in the count.

…

The big question is, How much do batters learn from pitch to pitch? The deeper into his repertoire a pitcher must go, the greater the advantage is for the batter. There are probably advantages to taking pitches besides drawing balls. I don’t think this applies to the full count, though, which might be why the swing rate is too damn high.

He also made his data available, and I’m going to steal it and re-organize it.

Quickly:

• It seems like the FB% tells us what I think most of us know; pitchers throw more fastballs to avoid walks when there are 2 or 3 balls in the count (exception being 2-2, which makes sense because they aren’t behind in the count in this situation).
• The zone % also makes sense to me.  With no strikes, it’s within 8 percent from 0 balls to 3 balls – very little change.
• With one strike, it ranges from 41 to 57%, and a hitter is just as likely to see a strike 3-1 as he is 3-0.
• The interesting data is with two strikes.  At 0-2 and 1-2, there’s really not much incentive to throw a strike; see if the hitter will get himself out.  But get to 3 balls and 3-0, 3-1, and 3-2 are within 3 percent of one another.
• With the swing %, a hitter is more likely to swing with each additional strike.  Wouldn’t that just be due to the batter knowing he might HAVE to swing in that count (particularly with two strikes)?
• I suppose the 3-2 swing % is highly correlated with the increase zone % from pitchers; that is, a pitcher is more likely to throw a strike with three balls and a hitter is more likely to swing with two strikes, so this is a perfect storm.

Anyway, it’s an interesting experiment in game theory that I thought I would share.